

pendency of grievance-arbitration proceedings or filing with another agency, among others, are circumstances which do not justify tolling the 30-day period. In the absence of circumstances justifying a tolling of the 30-day period, untimely complaints will not be processed.

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§ 1977.16 Notification of Secretary of Labor's determination.

Section 11(c)(3) provides that the Secretary is to notify a complainant within 90 days of the complaint of his determination whether prohibited discrimination has occurred. This 90-day provision is considered directory in nature. While every effort will be made to notify complainants of the Secretary's determination within 90 days, there may be instances when it is not possible to meet the directory period set forth in section 11(c)(3).

§ 1977.17 Withdrawal of complaint.

Enforcement of the provisions of section 11(c) is not only a matter of protecting rights of individual employees, but also of public interest. Attempts by an employee to withdraw a previously filed complaint will not necessarily result in termination of the Secretary's investigation. The Secretary's jurisdiction cannot be foreclosed as a matter of law by unilateral action of the employee. However, a voluntary and uncoerced request from a complainant to withdraw his complaint will be given careful consideration and substantial weight as a matter of policy and sound enforcement procedure.

§ 1977.18 Arbitration or other agency proceedings.

(a) *General.* (1) An employee who files a complaint under section 11(c) of the Act may also pursue remedies under grievance arbitration proceedings in collective bargaining agreements. In addition, the complainant may concurrently resort to other agencies for relief, such as the National Labor Relations Board. The Secretary's jurisdiction to entertain section 11(c) complaints, to investigate, and to determine whether discrimination has occurred, is independent of the jurisdiction

of other agencies or bodies. The Secretary may file action in U.S. district court regardless of the pendency of other proceedings.

(2) However, the Secretary also recognizes the national policy favoring voluntary resolution of disputes under procedures in collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., *Boy's Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks*, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); *Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox*, 379 U.S. 650 (1965); *Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Co.*, 375 U.S. 261 (1964); *Collier Insulated Wire*, 192 NLRB No. 150 (1971). By the same token, due deference should be paid to the jurisdiction of other forums established to resolve disputes which may also be related to section 11(c) complaints.

(3) Where a complainant is in fact pursuing remedies other than those provided by section 11(c), postponement of the Secretary's determination and deferral to the results of such proceedings may be in order. See, *Burlington Truck Lines, Inc., v. U.S.*, 371 U.S. 156 (1962).

(b) *Postponement of determination.* Postponement of determination would be justified where the rights asserted in other proceedings are substantially the same as rights under section 11(c) and those proceedings are not likely to violate the rights guaranteed by section 11(c). The factual issues in such proceedings must be substantially the same as those raised by section 11(c) complaint, and the forum hearing the matter must have the power to determine the ultimate issue of discrimination. See *Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co.*, F.2d (5th Cir., 1972), 41 U.S.L.W. 1049 (Oct. 10, 1972); *Newman v. Avco Corp.*, 451 F.2d 743 (6th Cir., 1971).

(c) *Deferral to outcome of other proceedings.* A determination to defer to the outcome of other proceedings initiated by a complainant must necessarily be made on a case-to-case basis, after careful scrutiny of all available information. Before deferring to the results of other proceedings, it must be clear that those proceedings dealt adequately with all factual issues, that the proceedings were fair, regular, and free of procedural infirmities, and that the outcome of the proceedings was not repugnant to the purpose and policy of the Act. In this